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Encounters on the Eastern Front: The Royal Naval Armoured Car Division in 
Russia 1915-1920 
 
Petty Officer Gerald Smyth began a diary on 14th January 1916, in a notebook he bought 
from the main store in Alexandrovsk, for 40 kopeks.1 Smyth was a member of the Royal 
Naval Armoured Car Division, en route to fight with the Russian army on the Eastern 
Front. The division had left Liverpool too late to make it through the ice to 
Archangel’sk and on via the railway to Petrograd: they would remain stranded in 
Alexandrovsk, a small town north of Murmansk, until the ice melted in May.2 Boredom 
may have played a part in Smyth’s decision to start his diary: he began by writing up 
his experiences since boarding the Umona in early December. However, his decision 
also stemmed from a sense – shared by other members of the division – that his 
experiences would be something out of the ordinary line of war service. It was ‘a 
novelty in the way of appointments’; Surgeon Lt-Commander King remembered, and 
a posting in great contrast to that of the infantrymen who really won the war, in the 
view of Commander Wells Hood.3 Many members of the unit kept diaries, and between 
them they took countless photographs. George Martin’s diary became the basis for a 
novel for teenagers by Joyce Marlow, published in 1967 as Billy Goes to War. In the 
trenches in Galicia in 1917, fighting alongside the rapidly disintegrating Russian army, 
Billy discusses developments in Russia’s revolutionary summer with his comrades. 
Who was Alexander Kerensky, they want to know. Was he a Bolshevik? Who were the 
Bolsheviks anyway? ‘I don’t know why you’re so bothered’, says cockney Fred Harris. 
‘It’s nothing to do with us’.4  
Russia’s war effort may have seemed remote to members of the Royal Naval 
Armoured Car Division and their fictional counterparts, but for strategists, economists, 
                                                 
1 G. H. Smyth diary, Imperial War Museum (IWM) 4190. 
2 Murmansk was founded in 1915, as the terminus of a new railway that would transport 
supplies to the interior from the Murman coast. Alexandrovsk, now Polyarny, was named 
only in 1896.  
3 W. H. King, ‘Ten Months with the Russian Army’ IWM 4172 f. 1; W. Wells Hood lecture, 
IWM 4257 f. 70. On wartime diary writing as a means of documenting both the remarkable 
and the mundane, see Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee and Frans Coetzee, Commitment and Sacrifice, 
Personal Diaries from the Great War (Oxford, 2015) pp. 1-15; Jessica Meyer, Men of War, 
Masculinity and the First World War in Britain (London, 2009) pp. 48-49; Nancy Martin 
(2015) ‘And all because it is war!’: First World War diaries, authenticity and combatant 
identity’, Textual Practice 29:7 (2015) pp.1245-1263. 
4 Joyce Marlow, Billy Goes to War (London, 1967) pp. 100-101. 
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and politicians in 1914-18, the connections between the two fronts were very clear. The 
Russian army relied on loans and munitions from their allies to support their war effort 
when it became apparent that they faced a long war. In turn, they placed an essential 
role in occupying German divisions in the east as the western front became static: Sir 
John French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, remarked that 
‘everything now depends on Russia’.5 When the Russian front collapsed in 1917, Allied 
strategists counted the divisions moving west, and desperately supported any force that 
promised a reconstitution of the eastern front.6  
The RNACD (comprising 500 men, 50 officers, 45 cars, 15 lorries and 50 
motorcycles) fought under Russian command on three different fronts: in the Caucasus 
(in the summer and autumn of 1916), in Roumania (through the winter of 1916-17), 
and in Kerensky’s summer offensive in Galicia in 1917. This article does not offer a 
history of the unit’s military engagements.7 Instead it sets the RNACD’s experiences 
in the broader context of the Anglo-Russian wartime relationship. In doing so, it 
contributes to several different historical fields. It contributes both to the history of the 
Anglo-Russian alliance and to the study of wartime diplomacy, drawing attention to 
decision-making processes, and problems, in the wartime alliance. It develops the 
literature on the Anglo-Russian supply relationship, relating the way that the unit was 
supplied and paid for to broader arrangements for Russian military supply. It touches 
also on the technological history of the First World War, by focusing on the technology 
and strategic purpose of armoured cars, the ways they were used, and the ways their 
designers and drivers thought they should be used, on the western and eastern fronts. It 
explores the impressions that men in the unit formed of the eastern front, offering a case 
study that builds on recent scholarly interest in the unexpected cultural encounters 
created by the war. Many members of the unit retained an interest in Russia, and this 
article also documents their involvement in interventionist schemes after 1917, adding 
                                                 
5 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917 (Oxford, 
1995) p. 344. 
6 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921 vol. 1 (Princeton, 1961) pp. 162-163, 
Michael Carley, ‘The Origins of the French Intervention in the Russian Civil War January-
May 1918: A Reappraisal’ Journal of Modern History 48:3 (September 1976) p. 421, p. 438. 
7 For a military history of the unit see Bryan Perrett and Anthony Lord, The Czar’s British 
Squadron (London, 1981), and Perrett’s recent British Armoured Car Operations in World 
War 1 (London, 2016). An account of their service on the eastern front is also given in 
Maksim Kolomiets, Bronia Russkoi Armii: broneavtomobili i bronepoezda v pervoi mirovoi 
voine (Moscow: Strategia KM, 2008) pp. 289-295. 
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thereby to our understanding of the motivations and rhetoric surrounding international 
intervention in Russia’s civil war. Finally it touches on the memory of wartime 
experience, discussing the RNACD’s appreciation of their unusual war experience as 
recorded in diaries, post-war lectures, memoirs, and exercises in autobiography. The 
RNACD’s tour of the Eastern Front is examined here through the prism of these 
overlapping fields of interest. The unit’s experiences shed light both on the operation 
of the wartime alliance, and on the ways in which the alliance, and the war, were 
understood. 
 
Formation and Transfer to Russia 
The dispatch of the RNACD to Russia was driven by military expediency, desire for a 
physical exhibition of British military support for Russia’s war effort, and the careerism 
of Oliver Locker Lampson, the unit’s commander. Locker Lampson was a conservative 
unionist MP who raised funds by subscription in the first months of the war, both for 
the Ulster Division, and for his own unit of armoured cars. This kind of ‘private 
assistance’ was vital, in Locker Lampson’s view, if the War Office were to put trained 
and equipped divisions in the field immediately on the outbreak of war.8 He had hoped 
his motorized unit might be attached to the Ulster Division, but the Admiralty (rather 
than the War Office) were the only service developing armoured cars at this time.9 
Although Locker Lampson is frequently credited with having personally financed the 
unit (at a cost of £30,000), correspondence in his personal papers makes clear that the 
money was raised through subscription, and supplemented by Ulster Unionist funds.10 
Locker Lampson also engaged in a vigorous recruitment campaign, touring Belfast and 
East Anglia (his family home was Newhaven Court, at Cromer in Norfolk) in an 
armoured Lanchester car.11  
Locker Lampson’s squadron was initially sent to Belgium, but by the spring of 
1915 it was apparent that the cars were not much use in entrenched conditions.12 Wells 
                                                 
8 Locker Lampson to Robertson, 10th September 1914, Norfolk Record Office OLL3316/1-2 
9 Locker Lampson to Churchill, 30th October 1914, Churchill Archive, Cambridge 
CHAR13/45/67; Locker Lampson to Admiralty, 3rd November 1914, The National Archives 
(TNA) ADM1/8403/428. 
10 Locker Lampson to Revelstoke, 9th April 1915, OLL3317/1-3, Locker Lampson to 
Admiralty, 15th December 1914, OLL179/115 
11 Smiles to Locker Lampson, 10th November 1915, OLL138/126 
12 Inspecting Commander, HM Armoured Car Force, to Air Department, 7th June 1915, TNA 
AIR1/147/15/64. 
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Hood remembered that because the cars could not be used to advantage, their machine 
guns were removed and placed at strategic points in the Belgian line of trenches.13 
General Bridges of the British Military Mission in Belgium gave Locker Lampson a 
blunt appreciation of the utility of the armoured cars in October: ‘I do not think they 
will get any scope here this year…. putting an occasional machine gun in the trenches 
is not pulling your weight’.14 Locker Lampson maintained that, as volunteers, his men 
viewed the prospect of inaction so seriously that some had asked to leave.15 There were 
rumours that the War Office planned to appropriate the cars, remove their armour and 
guns, and use them for transport purposes.16  
Locker Lampson was strongly opposed to any such plans to disband his unit. In 
March 1915 he learned that the Russian military liaison officer in Belgium, Andrei 
Prezhbiano, was negotiating the transfer of a comparable Belgian unit of armoured cars 
to the eastern front. He began lobbying through Prezhbiano, the Russian Government 
Committee in London, and the Russian Embassy, for a similar transfer for his own 
squadron.17 There was evidently a sound military rationale, and the record demonstrates 
considerable enthusiasm amongst Russian military representatives about securing the 
squadron. In April the Russian General Staff instructed the Russian Government 
Committee in London that it was ‘desirable to secure the squadrons with their whole 
personnel’.18 In October, when negotiations had not moved on, Prezhbiano asked the 
Assistant Minister of War for ‘immediate instructions in order that this advantageous 
affair does not fall through’.19 He highlighted both the military and the publicity value 
of the enterprise: so too did General Ermolov, the Russian military attaché in London, 
who urged swift approval, emphasizing ‘how useful they would be to our armies on our 
front, and what a particularly good political impression would be created if [Locker 
Lampson], as a Member of Parliament, could command such a unit and fight with our 
                                                 
13 Wells Hood lecture f. 22.  
14 Bridges to Locker Lampson, n.d. [October 1915], OLL173/10-11 
15 Locker Lampson to Broqueville, 20th October 1915, OLL173/49 
16 Locker Lampson to Boothby, 1st August 1915, OLL162/3 
17 On the Belgian armoured car unit see August Thiry and Dirk Van Cleemput, King Albert’s 
Heroes: Hoe 400 jonge Belgen vochten in Rusland en de VS veroverden (Antwerp, 2015). 
18 Leontiev to Timchenko-Ruban, 29th March/11th April 1915, in Report on RNAS armoured 
car squadron under Commander O. Locker Lampson… serving in Russia (London, 1918).  
19 Ignatiev to Anaksagor, 27th September/10th October 1915, Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi 
Voyenno-istoricheskiy Arkhiv (RGVIA) Fond 15304, Op. 1, ed. Khr. 201, II. 64. 
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army in the East’.20 Sybil Pinkerton, the wife of one of the men ‘caught in the net’ of 
Locker Lampson’s recruitment drive in Belfast, understood the unit’s mission to be ‘a 
Propaganda exercise to demonstrate to the Russians that the Allies were prepared to 
support her’.21 The unit’s transfer fitted into a broader culture of enterprises aimed at 
Anglo-Russian understanding in wartime, from the film unit that toured the Russian 
provinces showing films about the western front, and the Petrograd and Moscow 
propaganda bureaux that placed coverage of the British war effort in the Russian press, 
to the (unrealized) project for Russian village elders to be sent to the western front, in 
order to bring back their impressions.22 
 Nevertheless, Locker Lampson’s dogged refusal to have his war project derailed 
was just as important. By October, when Ermolov finally wrote to Locker Lampson 
officially, asking him to ‘bring these squadrons with their armaments and personnel 
under your own personal command to Russia’, considerable negotiation had gone on 
behind the scenes. Locker Lampson had cleared the arrangement with the Belgian 
Prime Minister and the Chief of the Belgian Staff. He had recruited 250 additional men, 
making the unit up to three squadrons, and negotiated the addition of 20 cars that had 
already been dispatched for use by the Russians. He had arranged transport for his cars 
and men to Archangel’sk, and was waiting only for official sanction from the 
Admiralty, and for the Foreign Office to formally offer the unit to the Russian 
Government.23  
 
Conflict and Cooperation in the Anglo-Russian Alliance 
Whatever its value as a gesture of Anglo-Russian cooperation, the transfer of the 
RNACD to the Eastern Front was nearly undone at the outset by confusion and 
infighting between and within departments both in Britain and Russia. On the British 
side, the arrival of Locker Lampson’s unit faced strong opposition from Sir George 
                                                 
20 Ermolov to Admiralty, 22nd October 1915, OLL179/111; Prezhbiano to Bridges, 17th 
October 1915, Koninklijk Legermuseum-Musée Royal de l’Armée 5720/1834-1836. 
21 Sybil Pinkerton, ‘From Ice to Rice: the story of John Dick Pinkerton’, Public Record Office 
of Northern Ireland (PRONI) D3754 f. 3. 
22 Keith Neilson, ‘Joy Rides?: British Intelligence and Propaganda in Russia, 1914-1917’ 
Historical Journal 24:4 (1981) pp. 885-906; M. L. Sanders, ‘British Film Propaganda in 
Russia 1916-1918’ Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 3:2 (1983) pp. 117-129; 
Minutes of the Anglo-Russian Commission, 29th August and 11th September 1917, TNA 
FO395/106 
23 Locker Lampson to Masterton-Smith, 22nd October 1915, FO371/2456; Ermolov to Locker 
Lampson, 2nd November 1915, OLL2865/6. 
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Buchanan, the British Ambassador at Petrograd. Buchanan formally offered the 
armoured cars to the Russian government in the autumn of 1915, and communicated 
their acceptance, but was unaware that the unit would comprise not only cars but also 
personnel. In December 1915 he was alarmed to hear that 40 British officers and 522 
non-commissioned officers had arrived at Alexandrovsk: ‘no information has been sent 
to me about them… I am placed in a very awkward position by receiving such 
information from Russian instead of British Military authorities’.24 This situation was 
symptomatic of a wider problem. Whilst most communications concerning Russia had 
been channeled through the embassy at Petrograd before the war, the wartime alliance 
necessitated a wider responsibility for policymaking and a new range of points of 
contact.25  The Ministry of Munitions, the War Office and the Admiralty were all 
involved, not to mention ad hoc interventions between people travelling between the 
two countries or already in Russia. Buchanan often felt he was being bypassed: officials 
at the Foreign Office thought so too, and frequently minuted this on communications.  
Within the Russian General Staff there were conflicting views about whether 
the armoured cars were wanted or not. There was ‘a section of the Russian military and 
naval authorities who favour retaining the detachment’ and ‘a strong party in the 
General Staff against it’.26 Russia’s politicians were also divided, with the Minister of 
War opposed to the squadron’s arrival in Russia, and the Minister of Marine keen to 
keep them.27 The men’s wages were one factor. The agreement Locker Lampson and 
Ermolov had drawn up specified that the British government would provide the cars, 
but that the Russian government would supply them and pay the recruits. As mechanics 
and drivers, all men in the force were Petty Officers: their pay was around six times 
that received by infantry on the western front, and exorbitant by Russian standards.28 
The British War Office and the Russian General Staff were at least united in their desire 
to scapegoat Ermolov, who they regarded as responsible for the whole affair: he was 
                                                 
24 Buchanan to FO, 17th December 1915, FO371/2456 
25 Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply: the Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914-17 (London, 1984) p. 
3. 
26 Buchanan to FO, 8th February 1916, FO371/2746 
27 Buchanan to FO, 15th February 1916, FO371/2746 
28 ‘Sailors of Fortune’, Anglia TV, 6th November 1988; Buchanan to Balfour, 7th March 1917, 
ADM1/8484/69 
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‘perfectly useless’ and had ‘been so long in England that he had become a regular “Club 
Englishman”.29  
 The situation was not helped by the unit’s late start and exceptionally rough 
journey. Unable to reach Archangel’sk, Locker Lampson made local arrangements to 
land at Alexandrovsk, exaggerating the risk of both pneumonia and dysentery on board 
the Umona.30 The cars were so severely damaged that they had to be sent back to 
England to be overhauled: meanwhile the Senior Naval Officer in the White Sea 
‘strongly deprecated’ Locker Lampson’s plan to train and acclimatize his men at 
Alexandrovsk over the winter. The most sensible option, he asserted, would be for them 
to return home and come out to Russia again when navigation opened.31 A war of 
telegrams ensued. Locker Lampson did his best to influence matters from 
Alexandrovsk, telling the Admiralty that everything was in good order for their winter 
stay, and instructing Buchanan that he had received ‘a special message from England’ 
asking the unit to stay put.32 The men in Locker Lampson’s unit had some idea what he 
was up to: PO Reed wrote to his wife that ‘if rumour speaks the truth we should all be 
on the way back now, because we heard that our Commander had orders from the 
Admiralty to return as we couldn’t get through. But he sent back to say that it was 
impossible as all the men were ashore.’33 Buchanan telegraphed to the Foreign Office 
that the Russian General Staff would be ‘immediately relieved if Locker Lampson 
motor detachment returned to England and they never heard anything more of it’, and 
that the desire for the recall of the unit was ‘freely expressed by officials in Petrograd 
from Minister of War downwards’. Buchanan pointed out (and was backed on this by 
the Foreign Office, again unhappy that he was being short-circuited) that ‘this sort of 
very expensive misunderstanding would be avoided if arrangements for such 
undertakings were made through Embassy for my staff understand Russians and are 
capable of dealing with them’.34 Not only were the men’s wages prohibitive, they 
                                                 
29 Saltwell to Nicolson, 19th December 1915, FO371/2456, and Buchanan to FO, 20th January 
1915, FO371/2746 
30 Locker Lampson to Admiralty, 10th January 1916, OLL178/458; Locker Lampson’s 
unpublished authobiographical typescript ‘Nothing to offer but blood’, GB206 Liddle 
Collection RUS30, Brotherton Library Leeds, ff. 114-116. 
31 S.N.O. White Sea to Admiralty, 22nd December 1915, 17th January 1916, AIR1/147/15/64  
32 Masterton-Smith to O’Beirne, n.d; Buchanan to FO, 30th December 1915, FO371/2456 
33 Reed, undated letter, IWM 11324 
34 Buchanan to FO, 20th January 1915; Masterton-Smith to Drummond, 3rd February 1915; 
Buchanan to FO, 8th February 1916, FO371/2746 
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would be a ‘constant anxiety’ to the Russian authorities as they would not be satisfied 
with Russian food or accommodation, and would cause friction with the Russian rank 
and file owing to their higher pay and special treatment.35 By late January it seemed 
certain that the unit would return to England: consensus in the Foreign Office was 
certainly in favour of it, and on 26th Buchanan telegraphed that the Emperor had decided 
that the armoured cars were to return home. 36  An Admiralty telegram to Locker 
Lampson around this time warned him not to intervene, as ‘disposal your squadron is 
being considered by authorities concerned’.37 
Aware that the ‘middle policy’ of returning to England and returning to Russia 
later was unlikely in fact to result in their return, Locker Lampson fought back.38 He 
secured inspections from British naval officers in the region: Captain Nugent, who 
reported that the unit were well accommodated and in good health, and that he was 
impressed with the manner in which they had adapted themselves to their ‘peculiar 
situation’; and Captain Kemp, who promised to advocate for this ‘hardworking and 
efficient’ force in Petrograd.39 Admiral Ugryumov at Archangel’sk agreed to support 
their retention at Alexandrovsk if the men could be used to unload cargoes at the port.40 
The matter was resolved when Locker Lampson arrived in Petrograd (travelling back 
to England and then through Norway), and secured an audience with Nicholas II, during 
which he presented a letter from the King offering the service of the armoured cars. 
Alfred Knox, the British military attaché in Russia, who shared Buchanan’s feelings 
about Locker Lampson, reported that ‘acceptance by the Russians was rendered 
necessary when Locker Lampson arrived and presented to the Emperor letter from the 
King some months old’.41 Locker Lampson spent a week at Stavka, the Russian military 
headquarters, renegotiating the agreement for his unit to stay.  
 Buchanan and Knox exacted a minor revenge when they stymied Locker 
Lampson’s attempt to have his men appear in Petrograd: he had been drilling them for 
                                                 
35 Buchanan to FO, 8th February 1915, FO371/2746 
36 Buchanan to FO, 26th January 1915, FO371/2746 
37 Admiralty to Locker Lampson, undated, OLL199/119 
38 The Admiralty confirmed that a return would mean ‘abandoning all idea of employment in 
Russia’. Admiralty to Phillimore, 1st February 1916, AIR1/147/15/64 
39 Locker Lampson to Admiralty, 1st January 1916, Nugent to Vaughan Lee, 29th January 
1916, AIR1/147/15/64; Gregory to Locker Lampson, n.d. [January 1916], OLL139/35; 
Gregory to Locker Lampson 13th February 1916, OLL139/74 
40 Phillimore to Admiralty, 2nd February 1916, AIR1/147/15/64; Masterton-Smith to 
Drummond, 3rd February 1916, FO371/2746 
41 Knox to Ellershaw, 7th May 1916, FO371/2746  
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a review in front of the tsar. Transporting the men and their necessities via Petrograd 
would interfere with vital transport of war materials, they argued: they were sure Locker 
Lampson’s men were also anxious to get to the front.42 If it was not any longer possible 
to withdraw the squadron altogether, ‘which would undoubtedly be the best course for 
our prestige and dealings with the Russians’, then they should be trained straight 
through Vologda to the Caucasus. 43  The personal animosity aside, it is clear that 
Buchanan and Knox felt the British armoured car unit had the potential to damage, 
rather than cement, Anglo-Russian relations.  
 
Armoured cars and their uses  
Armoured cars were a recent innovation, and at the outbreak of war in 1914 their design 
and strategic purpose were uncertain. In 19th century Britain they had been championed 
by motoring and military enthusiasts, but not by the military establishment.44 The first 
cars dispatched to France and Belgium by the Admiralty Air Service were rather hasty 
mock ups: Lieutenant-Commander Wells Hood described them as being ‘of very 
primitive design’, only bullet proof at over 150 yards, and with the driver encased in 
something which ‘resembled the top half of a coffin’.45 Many of those involved were 
pioneers both in design and use of the cars, and were pushing for recognition of the 
work they could do. Wells Hood drew up designs in his spare time, and was several 
times sent back to England to examine new cars. He also oversaw repairs in the field, 
where engines and gearboxes were fixed up with ‘wood plugs, soap, “plasticine”, etc’, 
or by ‘running melted lead revolver bullets into the damaged aluminium bases’.46 The 
Russian military, who were ahead in their appreciation of the utility of armoured cars, 
ordered small numbers before 1914 from British and French firms, and continued to do 
so throughout the war.47 
                                                 
42 Buchanan to FO, 16th March 1916 and 5th May 1916, FO371/2746 
43 Knox to Ellershaw, 7th May 1916, FO371/2746 
44 David Fletcher, War Cars: British Armoured Cars in the First World War (London, 1987), 
pp. 1-6. 
45 Wells Hood lecture f. 2. 
46 Wells Hood lecture ff. 52-53, f. 60. 
47 Details of Russian purchases before and during the war, and of cars built or armoured in 
Russia during the war, can be found in B. T. White, Tanks and other Armoured Fighting 
Vehicles 1900-1918 (London, 1970) pp. 109-187. For their employment on the eastern front 
see Kolomiets, Bronia Russkoi Armii. 
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 The uses to which armoured cars were put were also fluid, and were understood 
in different ways. As they were pioneered by the Royal Naval Air Service, one 
interpretation was that they were intended to work in conjunction with aircraft: either 
by protecting airfields, or in joint reconnaissance and attacks on enemy patrols.48 
Another mooted purpose was that they were to act as a fast moving fighting force, doing 
work traditionally performed by cavalry. These were also the broad purposes for which 
a pre-war commission had concluded they might be used in the Imperial Russian 
Army.49 During their two years in Russia the RNACD developed their own sense of 
where and how they could be used to good purpose. They were used for reconnaissance, 
although not in combination with aircraft. They were used to storm villages held by the 
enemy, a tactic developed in Belgium but put to good effect, for example, at Roobla on 
the Romanian front.50 They were also however used to storm trenches, work which 
those driving and commanding the cars resisted and resented. James MacDowell 
repeatedly complained to his diary about this misuse, and in the winter of 1916 
Commander Gregory issued specific instructions that the cars were ‘not designed to 
press an attack home against infantry entrenched’: the heavier cars should mainly be 
regarded as armoured car destroyers, but could be used against villages, sandbag 
redoubts, etc’.51  
They were found to be extremely effective in covering a retreat, as they could 
remain in action at the front under enemy attack, while a more or less orderly retreat 
was organized. They had what Locker Lampson described as ‘unique opportunities’ to 
try this out, both in the Romanian and Galician campaigns.52 At Vizirul in Romania, 
the British armoured cars covered the 4th Siberian corps while they retreated, making a 
display of fire at the front line trenches until half an hour after the Russians had left.53 
PO Smith recalled that the cars ‘raced up and down harrying the enemy at all points, 
doing everything and anything to gain a few moments’ respite’ for the retreating 
                                                 
48 Wells Hood lecture f. 3; Pinkerton, ‘Ice to Rice’ f. 2, L R Hulls, ‘A Right and a Left’, IWM 
4043, f. 5.  
49 Bruce Menning, Bayonets before bullets: the Imperial Russian Army 1861-1914 
(Bloomington, 1992) pp. 232-3. 
50 Smiles’s report, ADM116/1626 
51 James MacDowell diary, 29th November 1916, PRONI T3896; Gregory to Smiles, 20th 
December 1916; Gregory to Wells Hood, 20th December 1916, ADM116/1626 
52 Locker Lampson report of 16th August 1917, CHAR2/95/38-71 
53 Smiles’s report, TNA ADM166/1626; Gregory to Locker Lampson, 12th December 1916, 
OLL139/40 
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forces.54 In retreat, Locker Lampson pointed out, they had the additional advantage of 
knowing the roads along which their retreat and the enemy’s advance would be 
conducted.55 The cars were generally taken in to action backwards, reversing towards 
the enemy.  
 While the Eastern Front offered greater opportunities for a war of movement, 
the condition of the roads often prevented the effective use of the cars. In the Caucasus 
Smith judged that they were ‘taking cars over passes and roads that had never before 
been traversed by mechanically propelled vehicles’. Roads were ‘mere tracks or existed 
only in the imagination’.56 At Braila King reported that they had all their work cut out 
to get through the appalling mud, ‘and this – mark you! On a road marked as “chaussee” 
on the map’. 57 In Galatz in early 1917 eight weeks of continual snowfall made it 
impossible to use the cars. They could not travel after dark because of the large number 
of potholes and fear of damaging the cars (headlights at the front were not allowed). 
On numerous occasions the guns were removed from the cars and set up in trailers, or 
operated in the trenches. While the cars were used for purposes other than those 
intended, RNACD men often ended up fighting without the cars.  
 
Questions of supply 
The experiences of the RNACD in Russia also tell us something about the Anglo-
Russian supply relationship. As it became apparent that the Allies were fighting a war 
of much longer duration than they had anticipated, questions of finance and supply 
became central to the functioning of the Anglo-Russian alliance. By the end of 1914 
the British Government had already authorized loans to the tsarist regime amounting to 
£60,000,000.58  With loans from their allies the Russian government placed orders 
overseas for the military equipment and ammunition they needed to service their war 
effort. Russian purchasing was arranged through several ad hoc committees: the inter-
allied Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement (CIR), set up in August 1914 to 
coordinate orders and prevent competitive purchasing driving up prices; the Russian 
                                                 
54 C. J. Smith typed recollections, GB206 Liddle Collection RUS30, f. 21 
55 Locker Lampson, ‘Nothing to offer but blood’ f. 104 
56 Smith recollections ff. 18-20 
57 King, ‘Ten Months’ f. 7 
58 Keith Neilson, ‘Managing the War: Britain, Russia and Ad Hoc Government’ in Michael 
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Purchasing Commission at the War Office (later the Russian Supply Committee at the 
Ministry of Munitions) which looked after Russian orders in Britain; and the Russian 
Government Committee, established in early 1915 to give representatives of the 
Russian War Ministry closer oversight over purchasing in Britain. There were 
numerous tensions in the supply relationships: perennial purchasing outside the CIR 
and other control mechanisms by the Russian War Ministry; British reluctance to 
authorize Russian purchases for which there was not shipping available, and to ship 
orders when material was still not unloaded at Russia’s northern ports; and the tendency 
of British and American firms to accept payment for orders they could not fulfill.59  
In Alexandrovsk and Archangel’sk, members of the RNACD witnessed the 
difficulties in supply first hand. Archangel’sk was the first port of choice for shipping 
munitions from Britain to Russia, but there was substantial congestion at the port, and 
the seasonal nature of shipping routes complicated matters further.60 The RNACD were 
tasked with unloading boats at Alexandrovsk that had not made it to Archangel’sk, 
organizing the wharf and repacking machinery for transportation to the front.61 PO 
Reed noted ‘all around here and up to Archangel the Quays are packed with munitions 
of war which can’t get away until spring, also there is millions of pounds of stuff still 
on the boats not touched.’62 Surgeon Lt. Commander King described Archangel’sk as 
‘the scene of feverish activity’ in the summer months, with ‘miles of extra wharfage’ 
constructed to berth the ships constantly arriving.63 PO Smyth also reported ‘piles and 
piles of wood on each side, dozens of ships of all sorts, shapes and sizes… All the boats 
have government stores, munitions, rifles, barbed wire etc’.64  
The RNACD also dealt directly with the munitions problem. While isolated in 
the north, a party led by Commander Wells Hood was dispatched to run ammunition 
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from Murmansk to the railhead at Petrozavodsk, as the Murmansk-Petrograd railway 
was under construction but far from complete. Up to 100 tons of ammunition per day 
were being worked across a 200-mile line, using relay parties of men, reindeer, and 
sleighs.65 Wells Hood described seeing new French and Japanese rifles, and ‘a very 
large number of old French rifles dated 1874’ with lead bullets ‘the size of the end of 
one’s finger’.66 Wells Hood’s party also guarded German prisoners of war who were 
constructing the new railway. He wrote to James MacDowell that the prisoners ‘seemed 
astonished to see British troops so far north and in Russia’.67 In Alexandrovsk, men of 
the armoured car unit mounted and manned a gun to guard the point where the telegraph 
cable to England entered the sea: there were fears that an attempt would be made to cut 
it.68 This was an unenviable job in freezing temperatures, and with a bitter wind.69  
 The process of ordering for the unit itself was circuitous. The RNACD was 
technically part of the Russian Army, but most of their supplies came from the 
Admiralty. The Russian Government Committee in London held credits for their use, 
and both the CIR and the British Treasury had to sanction purchases before orders could 
be submitted to the Admiralty. Even when they bought from Russian sources the 
invoices were directed to the Russian Government Committee, and John Delmar 
Morgan, who looked after the unit’s affairs in England, was informed through the CIR 
to what extent their credit had been depleted.70 Locker Lampson regarded the ordering 
process as ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘very slow, sometimes being three months behind 
time’.71 Repeated attempts were made to simplify matters, but in the spring of 1917 the 
Provisional Government brought in new and equally complex ordering arrangements. 
Orders now required the sanction of a new committee dealing with external purchasing 
in Petrograd, and this at one point left the unit completely without credit or 
authorization for supplies.72 Locker Lampson and Delmar Morgan used the substantial 
Russian contribution to the unit’s upkeep so far to press for further British financial 
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support, and for new cars. The RNACD was after all ‘the only British Force in foreign 
lands, the expense of which does not fall completely on the British Government.’73 Here 
Locker Lampson and Delmar Morgan found themselves in chance agreement with 
George Buchanan, who after the February revolution lobbied for the Admiralty to start 
paying for the unit themselves. James Masterton Smith, Private Secretary to the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, rebuffed this approach on the grounds that no such request had 
been made by the Russian government, and noted Buchanan’s longstanding prejudice 
against the unit.74 Masterton Smith had cut through the complex financial arrangements 
back in 1915, when the agreement on financing the unit was signed, noting that while 
the Russian government agreed to pay for the supply and upkeep of the RNACD, ‘no 
doubt they will borrow the money from us to enable them to do so!’75 
 
Ambassadors of the Anglo-Russian Alliance 
In a speech to the force reported in the press, Locker Lampson insisted that ‘upon our 
lonely shoulders falls the duty of maintaining in Russia the prestige of British arms and 
traditions’.76 In fact a range of Allied enterprises operated on the eastern front: some 
official and some voluntary, some pragmatic and some symbolic. The RNACD came 
into contact and cooperated with a number of them. Their direct counterpart was the 
Belgian armoured car division, which had reached Russia in the autumn of 1915 and 
(unlike the RNACD) had been inspected by the Tsar at Peterhof. They took part in 
Brusilov’s successful offensive on the Galician front in the summer of 1916, and 
crossed paths with the British unit – militarily and socially – during the Kerensky 
offensive and the Galician retreat.77  The memoirs of members of the Belgian unit 
record similar frustrations posed by unfamiliar ways of operating, by the road 
conditions and particularly the rain and mud. 78  The RNACD encountered French 
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aviators in Romania, and an Anglo-French flying mission in Galicia. 79  In Romania in 
the winter of 1916-17 they often saw a team of British demolition experts, headed by 
Colonel Norton Griffiths M.P., who had a ‘roving commission with instructions to 
destroy factories and machinery likely to be of use to the enemy’. Prior to the retreat 
members of the RNACD were drafted in to assist with this work: Gerald Smyth reported 
destroying ‘dynamos lathes boilers engines etc’ in factories in Galatz, and PO Smith 
recalled setting fire to fields of wheat, and smashing oil wells with depth charges, 
sometimes under shotgun fire from Romanian farmers. 80  
There was also Anglo-Russian cooperation in the medical sphere. In Petrograd, 
an Anglo-Russian hospital financed by British fundraising efforts was established in 
the autumn of 1915.81 The armoured car division collaborated more closely with the 
Scottish Women’s Hospital, who had an outpost at Reni on the Romanian front. The 
surgeons attached to the RNACD helped at the hospital, and in early 1917 they helped 
to evacuate the staff and their stores.82 King commented both on the ‘excellent work’ 
and ‘splendid efficiency’ of the Scottish Women’s Hospital, and on their politics, 
describing them as ‘funny old dears… of the suffragette type’: ‘Their rig consisting of 
breeches, very short skirt and sputters would cause a smile in England, but no one here 
seems to take much notice of it’.83 At Pidhaitsi in Galicia, there was also a Russian Red 
Cross Hospital run by ‘two English lady surgeons’, which proved ‘a very convenient 
place to which to send our wounded’.84 Temporary surgeon Scott raised subscriptions 
from private patients in England to bring out up to date medial equipment to Russia: he 
recorded having raised £100 in one day.85  
 Despite the variety of Allied enterprises at work in Russia, the RNACD were 
evidently regarded as a promising focus for publicity, and considerable effort went into 
maximizing the public impact of their stay in Russia. At the beginning of June 1916 
they began a two-week journey to the Caucasian front. No opportunity was missed en 
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route to fête the unit, deliver speeches, and present them with tokens. In Archangel’sk 
they were met with crowds, bunting and a brass band playing ‘warlike tunes’.86 In a 
speech celebrating the wartime alliance, the Deputy Mayor called on several local 
examples of Anglo-Russian rapprochement. He recalled Richard Chancellor’s landing 
nearby in 1553 and Chancellor’s subsequent meeting with Ivan IV, along with the 
‘courteous return’ in 1912 of a church bell looted from Zaiatskii island (one of the 
Solovetskii islands) by a British naval detachment during the Crimean War.87 The 
RNACD were presented with an icon featuring the patron saint of Archangel’sk, 
Archangel Michael, which they were to carry into battle.88 The British Vice Consul at 
Archangel’sk felt their brief stay demonstrated their potential as a source of publicity 
for the alliance. Their influence on the military situation might be slight, but their 
journey through Russia would bring home ‘the fact of the alliance and of the British 
share in it to many Russians in all classes of society, to whom it has hitherto made little 
active appeal’.89  
From Vologda (where the officers were given a banquet at a local hotel and the 
men received shashlik, black bread and soup) they were met at ‘almost every stopping 
place’ by a band, meals and speeches. Wells Hood recalled this as ‘more of a nuisance 
than a pleasure’ as it meant sleeping in one’s clothes, and being frequently woken.90 At 
Alexandrov Pinkerton noted: ‘The band out and all that sort of rot. You have no idea 
how fed up one gets with it’; and at Rostov MacDowell recalled turning out at 5.30 am 
for a ‘rotten’ meal.91 Robert Bruce Lockhart, the British Vice Consul in Moscow, gives 
some insight into the hasty preparations for the unit’s reception in the city, which he 
had learned about only on the day they were to arrive. Moscow residents, both English 
and Russian, were mobilized to provide tours of the city. The RNACD were given 
lunches and dinners by the officers of the Moscow Automobile Section, and by the 
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British Club. There were ‘a good many speeches in which both the English and the 
Russian officers expressed their firm belief in the Anglo-Russian entente and in the 
final triumph of the allies’.92 On the third day the RNACD, accompanied by a military 
band, marched from the Yaroslavl Station to the British Church: partly as a result of 
the good weather their procession through ‘the principal streets of Moscow’ was 
cheered and ‘pelted with flowers’ by a large crowd.93 The British Press Bureau in 
Moscow used their contacts to secure coverage of the visit by the local press.94 Some 
elements of British cultural output of the war had made it to the eastern front. King 
commented (and he is supported in this by Wells Hood) that ‘whenever a band catches 
sight of any English uniforms they insist on playing “Tipperary”. They must think it a 
sort of national anthem of ours. They have even got as far as singing a Russian version 
of it’.95 
Locker Lampson also made sure that his force had a public profile at home. 
Their arrival at various stopping places was reported in the Daily Chronicle, the Daily 
Mail and the Sunday Pictoral. Photographs of their exploits in Alexandrovsk, Moscow, 
and later Galicia (where they were heralded as the ‘bright spot in the Russian retreat’) 
appeared in the papers. At several times the unit were accompanied by British 
journalists – in Romania by Scotland Liddell of The Sphere, and in Galicia by George 
Mewes, a photographer for the Daily Mirror.96 In a report to the Admiralty, Locker 
Lampson credited ‘the presence now of Englishmen in khaki, the photographs of them 
daily and weekly in the Russian papers, the cinematograph films appearing throughout 
the towns and villages of Russia’, with ‘a complete change of public opinion’ about the 
British role in the war.97 
Locker Lampson was also anxious to demonstrate that the Russians valued his 
force for their contribution to the military effort on the eastern front. He kept a series 
of testimonials from officers of the Russian army (Captain Krotkov, the Senior Naval 
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Officer at Kola, General Trotsky of the Vladikavkaz Cadet Corps, and General Sirelius 
of the 4th Siberian Corps for example) to illustrate their utility when lobbying the 
Admiralty for support. 98  Some British representatives also testified to their good 
reputation: Admirals Jerram and Phillimore both reported to this effect. Phillimore 
recalled that ‘The Daily Report at Head Quarters often contained flattering references 
to their services’, and that they had won many medals between them.99 This last point 
is borne out by their personnel records. Most common was the silver breast medal with 
a St Stanislas ribbon, awarded to 237 members of the unit. Around 190 awards of St 
George’s medals, or the higher St George’s cross, were made.100 The most prestigious 
award was Walter Smiles’s Order of St George, a decoration for officers that King 
recorded was ‘very highly-prized in the Russian Army, and is more or less the 
equivalent of our D.S.O’.101 Whether the medals awarded are any real measure of 
regard for their contribution is a moot point: certainly some in the unit believed the 
Russians handed them out like toffees. In Billy Goes to War, one character suggests 
that neither British or Russian authorities paid close attention to who received the 
medals: ‘I bet the Russians said ‘Here we’ll give you fifty medals to keep the boys 
happy’. And our officers stuck pins in fifty names’.102 British decorations were harder 
to come by. In 1917, a request for decorations was rebuffed on the grounds that ‘the 
present time is not one for making awards to forces in Russia, which country is trying 
to negotiate a separate peace’. Locker Lampson protested that the RNACD were ‘in no 
sense responsible for the conditions in Russia’.103   
 
Encounters on the Eastern Front 
The Great War engineered an array of unexpected cultural encounters: within armies, 
in different theatres of war and prisoner of war camps, and through propaganda.104 We 
have already seen that members of the RNACD regarded events in Russia as exotic and 
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found it difficult to relate their experiences to their understanding of the ‘real war’ on 
the western front. Certainly they felt themselves much cut off from home – particularly 
in Alexandrovsk, where few mails or newspapers were received, but also once they 
were at the front.105 There were frequent complaints about lost and delayed mail, which 
when it appeared, was at best three months and at worst a year out of date.106 While 
Surgeon Lt-Commander King remarked that ‘Now and again we hear all sorts of 
rumours about successes by the allies, but its impossible to believe all one hears’; PO 
Reed asked his wife if conscription had been introduced yet, how Wimbledon were 
getting on, and whether the war was yet finished .107 In fact the delay in news was not 
always bad – King managed (with ‘a prolonged struggle of dictionaries’) to read about 
Asquith’s resignation (5th December) on 9th December 1916, and Smyth heard about 
the death of Kitchener (5th June) on 12th June.108 But the perception that they were badly 
cut off persisted nonetheless.  
The challenges of the Russian language contributed to this feeling. Language 
was an issue for officers negotiating the unit’s movements, for medial staff working 
with their Russian counterparts, and in the daily transactions of all the men of the unit. 
They had Russian liaison officers and interpreters; some officers also spoke Russian, 
and many diarists in the division kept notes of essential terms. Occasionally they met 
Russians who spoke English.109 More often they communicated in French, as with 
General Korolkov of the 4th Siberian Corps, who played chess with officers of the 
division and frequently invited them to ‘entertainments at the “Sobranye” or mess’.110 
King conversed in bad German with a doctor on the Romanian front in January 1917, 
and regretted the ‘Tower of Babel trouble’ was preventing his getting attached to a 
Russian field hospital. 111  On the other hand language difficulties did not prevent 
members of the RNACD playing football with the Russians, going to the theatre, or 
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making frequent visits to drinking dens: the ‘thieves’ den’, an underground place with 
a code knock, and ‘Boris’s’, run by an ex-Russian soldier with a poorly-set arm.112 
 The five months the RNACD spent in Alexandrovsk were not the most 
favourable start to their tour of the Russian fronts. The Senior Naval Officer for the 
White Sea described Alexandrovsk as ‘a tiny place’ with few inhabitants: before the 
war it had been ‘only the summer resort of whalers and fishing craft’. The village was 
surrounded by rocky, snowy hills, and it was impossible to get more than half a mile 
outside it without snowshoes or skis. ‘Roads – of course there are none. Luckily a lake 
at the back of the village affords a level space for exercise and drill’.113 Wells Hood 
remembered the residents of Alexandrovsk being ‘very suspicious of us’, perhaps on 
account of their having taken over the school house, a club and a half-completed cinema 
for billeting purposes; perhaps also because they caused the prices at the two local 
stores to rise considerably.114 Reports filed by and about the squadron emphasized that 
their billets were warm, uncrowded and well-lit; that they had fitted up a hospital and a 
bakery; and that all kinds of enterprises were carried on with vigor: classes in 
mechanics, gunnery, semaphore, and Russian for example.115 They organized football 
matches and concerts, and sleighed for entertainment in the evenings.116 However, 
many diary entries and letters written by men in the unit display a rather less rosy view 
of their predicament, ‘stuck in this miserable outlandish spot on short rations until the 
spring’.117 Their clothing (which Locker Lampson had commissioned at home) was ‘a 
rotten rig to look at (leather coat, leather pants, rubber sea-boots and sheep-skin hat)’.118 
Food – a major preoccupation in many First World War diaries – caused rows that 
persisted from February through to May.119 Locker Lampson had purchased a large 
supply of reindeer meat locally, which was supplemented by black bread, bully beef, 
salt-fat pork, peas and beans.120 While Wells Hood recalled the men decorating their 
billets with ‘grotesque figures’ modeled from the bread, PO McCullagh devoted verses 
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of poetry to the appalling food, and other members of the division penned a ‘White Sea 
Hymn of Hate’.121  
 On their journey south in the spring of 1916, and on the Caucasian, Romanian 
and Galician fronts, members of the RNACD had ample opportunity to witness military 
and home front conditions. They observed the difficulties caused by overloaded rail 
networks. Even before leaving Alexandrovsk, PO Reed was aware that ‘we shall be a 
good time travelling, by all accounts. The Russian Railways and Transport are very 
busy with munitions etc; and none too fast either.’122 MacDowell estimated that the 
trains travelled at an average of 15 miles per hour.123 As they travelled south, delays 
became ‘more and more prolonged, the cause being congestion of the lines with military 
trains’. There were ‘innumerable wearisome halts at passing places’, and conflicting 
orders given by different divisional commanders. Passengers on King’s train south were 
‘cheered up’ by their conductor telling them that a ‘a troop-train on an adjoining siding 
had already been hung up 2 days!’124 Watching the passing countryside from the train, 
Pinkerton surmised that ‘the big landlord is still top dog in these parts’.125 In the autumn 
and winter of 1916 they noted inflated prices in the towns in which they were billeted. 
In Odessa MacDowell hoped that they wouldn’t ‘strike another town where the prices 
of things are so abnormally high’: he ‘had to pay about 3 / 4 times as much for 
everything as I should have done at home’. In Braila ‘the prices were as exorbitant as 
they were in Odessa. A small loaf which would have cost 3d at home, cost here 2 francs 
= 1s 9d’.126 Several diarists expressed surprise at the availability of vodka, despite the 
introduction of prohibition in 1914. Officers like Wells Hood and King had ‘vodka and 
other intoxicants’ pressed upon them at dinner in Moscow. Pinkerton noted the broader 
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availability of alcohol: in Alexandrovsk at Easter the main street was ‘the parade 
ground of the mighty drunk and the mighty near drunk’.127 
The division’s medical staff commented on arrangements for treatment of the 
wounded. At Alexandrovsk Staff-Surgeon Scott and his team treated three survivors of 
the Sappho, who had made their way across the ice on foot when their ship, frozen in, 
had run out of supplies: they amputated half of one survivor’s foot, and three fingers 
on each of his hands.128 On board the Dvinsk from Alexandrovsk from Archangel’sk 
they were responsible for 618 prisoners of war (many of whom had scurvy) and 450 
sick Russian workmen.129 At Topalul in Romania, they established a clearing station 
that treated more than 2,000 wounded.130 In the aftermath of a series of explosions of 
war material at Bakaritsa in the summer of 1916, King worked for three days in a 
hospital at Archangel’sk, and described the hospital as under-equipped and under-
staffed to deal with the emergency. He noted the lack of eye instruments, and the 
‘appalling atmosphere’ in the hospital as a result of each ward being sealed off. He 
found the Russians quicker than the English to amputate limbs, but offered some 
reluctant compliments to the Russian medics he worked with: he was ‘bound to confess’ 
that a ‘Russian lady doctor’ who he saw amputate a leg ‘did the job very well’.131  
Keith Neilson’s assertion that the British believed Russian soldiers ‘capable of 
inhuman feats of bravery and endurance’ is in many respects borne out by the 
reflections of members of the RNACD.132 Wells Hood for example wrote that ‘The 
Russians are splendid fellows and fight like Hell, live on practically nothing, and never 
complain… although they go into the trenches and never come out again for thirty days, 
they sing both when going in and coming out’.133 Pinkerton had ‘generally pictured the 
Russians as poor gunners’, but ‘Their shooting was a revelation, almost as good as the 
Germans’.134 RNACD members were impressed by Cossack troops, who they first saw 
                                                 
127 Wells Hood lecture f. 45; King letters, 4th December 1916; Pinkerton, ‘Ice to Rice’ ff.4-5. 
On prohibition see Patricia Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late 
Imperial Russia (Oxford, 2002) pp. 151-2, and David Christian, ‘Prohibition in Russia 1914-
1925’ Australian Slavonic and East European Studies 9:2 (1995) pp. 89-118. 
128 Locker Lampson report, January 26th 1916, OLL178/459; Goodier diary 18th January 1916. 
129 Staff-Surgeon Scott’s report, OLL178/434-437 
130 Locker Lampson, ‘Nothing to offer but blood’ f. 177; King letters, 12th and 16th December 
1916. 
131 King, ‘Ten Months’ 
132 Neilson, Strategy and Supply pp. 1-2. 
133 Wells Hood lecture, f. 61 
134 Pinkerton, ‘Ice to Rice’, f. 12 
 23 
fight in the Caucasus: they were ‘splendid horsemen and awful looking toughs’, and 
made ‘short work’ of their Kurdish opponents.135 In Galicia too Pinkerton found the 
Cossack division they were attached to be ‘fine fellows’ with ‘a great contempt for the 
Russian Infantry’… ‘they nearly eat your head off if you call them ‘Russian’.136  
The stringent discipline in the Russian army came as a substantial shock to 
many of the men. PO Rodwell remembered the Russian soldiers being ‘treated like 
animals more or less’.137 Pinkerton reported that the Russian soldier ‘can’t be out after 
9 o’clock in the street. If an officer addresses him he must get to the salute and keep his 
hand there if the officer should keep speaking for one hour. He may not enter a first-
class compartment or restaurant. He may not use the tramway without a permit and he 
has no civil rights’.138 MacDowell likewise commented that ‘Military etiquette is very 
strict in Russia and no one except officers and people of high rank are allowed in the 
1st class hotels and restaurants’. British officers were ‘compelled by the Russians to 
carry swords when out in the street’, and ‘the “fag” of returning the salutes of the 
Russian soldiers was terrible’.139 
  When the February revolution broke out (on 23rd February / 8th March), some 
of the RNACD were at Galatz, and others at Tiraspol. In Galatz, King heard about the 
uprising on 17th March, but received ‘very few details beyond the fact that there had 
been two or three days’ fighting in Petrograd’. In Tiraspol, Goodier recorded news of 
‘grave trouble in the principal towns of Russia’ on 18th March, and in subsequent days 
noted that ‘the spirit of unrest is working its way into the citizens of this town’, as mass 
meetings of the military and civilian population were held.140 Where officers or men 
offered explanations for the revolution they emphasized (as did other English 
observers) the pro-Germanism and corruption that had characterized the tsar’s court, 
and the liberalism and vigour of the new provisional government. PO Reed’s statement 
that ‘Now Russia may be able to do something’ was typical.141 When they moved to 
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Galicia in the summer of 1917, the revolution’s impact on military operations was much 
more evident. Officers in the unit were taken aback by the existence of soldiers 
committees, the refusal to salute, and the scramble for places on a train regardless of 
class.142   
Most officers’ memoirs give the impression that the men of the RNACD were 
as horrified at the idea of equality in the army as their superiors, but it is clear that they 
had been equally horrified at the inequality that preceded it. Neither were they shy of 
resisting authority themselves. Both Pinkerton and Goodier recalled an incident with a 
Russian officer who was offended at not being saluted by RNACD men in a restaurant, 
and went to strike one of them: ‘the man in question retaliated by hitting him with such 
a welt that he put him clean through a case of pastry’.143 Goodier regarded the Russian 
officers as ‘absolute pigs’, but his diary expresses his own and his peers’ contempt for 
the ‘high-handedness and selfish nature’ of the British officers too. 144  PO Reed 
described the men’s resistance to the ‘petty little rules’ that were enforced upon them 
at Tiraspol, including not smoking in the streets, and wearing identification discs. In 
the week before the revolution, they staged their own protest: ‘we all went on strike and 
we went out all smoking in to the town, then of course there were meetings and 
speeches.’145 PO Smyth’s diary tells us he went out in the evening ‘smoking furiously 
and with no “discs” on’, and that over 300 men had their names taken for refusing to 
wear ID discs.146 While they sympathized with the lot of the Russian soldiers, this 
protest was not a demonstration of solidarity. A note pinned up in front of the Adjutant’s 
office demanded that the RNACD men be ‘treated as Britishers. We are neither convicts 
or conscripts’. They would not tolerate being ‘made to be like the Russian soldier’, and 
believed ‘those in authority [in the unit] will have something to answer for’ when they 
got back to England.147 An order of 21st March that members of the unit ‘must not enter 
into any conversation with Russian soldiers or take part in any demonstration’, and that 
if they witnessed a demonstration they should return to their base, demonstrates the 
nervousness of officers of the unit.148 
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Intervention in the Revolution and Civil War 
One of the most controversial dimensions of the RNACD’s Russian tour was their 
suspected involvement in the Kornilov affair of August 1917. In early August Kornilov, 
as Commander in Chief, moved troops of the Cossack ‘Wild Division’ towards 
Petrograd with the intention of occupying the city. The Petrograd Soviet organized 
forces to defend the city, with substantial help from the Bolsheviks: the incident 
strengthened the Bolsheviks’ position in the capital and seriously discredited Alexander 
Kerensky as Prime Minister. The fullest account of Locker Lampson’s complicity is 
given by Michael Kettle, who was told by an RNACD officer that Locker Lampson had 
set off to support Kornilov’s move towards Petrograd, but had been stopped on the road 
by revolutionary soldiers.149 George Buchanan tells us in his memoirs (and in reports 
to the Foreign Office) that he had been asked by Russian industrialist Aleksei Putilov 
to put the armoured car division at Kornilov’s disposal. Buchanan refused: he regarded 
it as ‘a very naïve proceeding… to ask an Ambassador to conspire against the 
Government to which he was accredited’. He ‘would not betray their confidence’, but 
‘would not give them either my countenance or support’.150  
Locker Lampson’s reports to the Admiralty in July and August 1917 were 
complimentary about Kornilov, but not unconditionally so: he was ‘the outstanding 
figure in this country’; a ‘resolute and honest man without fear’; but lacked ‘knowledge 
of western life’ and ‘sympathy with democratic ideals’.151 Locker Lampson’s relations 
with Kerensky in Galicia were also good, and a testimonial from Kerensky praising the 
work of the armoured cars, written after the Kornilov affair, survives in Locker 
Lampson’s papers.152 It is clear from the diaries of the men of the unit, which record in 
fairly banal terms what they did each day, that the cars did not move, and there is no 
evidence that they knew what was going on: although Wells Hood, in a lecture after the 
war, made an oblique reference to their ‘going to join Korniloff’, whose ‘intentions 
were to attack Petrograd’.153 There is plenty of evidence however that Locker Lampson 
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did not display a conventional obedience to structures and orders. In an incident in 
Husiatin in July, Locker Lampson had refused to get involved when asked by 
Bagration, the commander of the Wild Division, to help defend the town against armed 
deserters looting it – he replied that he must ‘only safeguard our stores and must not 
fire on Russians’. However, he did admit handing over to Bagration half a dozen Lewis 
guns and 50,000 rounds of ammunition, and to detailing instructors who would teach 
Bagration’s men how to use them.154 The only contemporary report we have from 
Locker Lampson about the Kornilov affair states that on ‘the day, when [Kornilov] 
decided to attempt his coup d’etat, he asked for the use of our Armoured Cars. His staff 
subsequently attributed their failure to our refusal to cooperate. Within 7 days Mr 
Kerensky in conversation expressed much the same opinion’.155  
 Following the October revolution there were plenty of further opportunities for 
interventionist schemes. The bulk of the RNACD had been sent home on leave in 
September 2017, leaving only 80 men and five officers, with 113 cars, at their new base 
at Kursk. 156  On Christmas Day 1917 local Bolsheviks requisitioned the cars: the 
remaining members of the unit did their best to put them out of action before they were 
towed away.157 Locker Lampson had no intention that they should return home entirely. 
In early October, in response to Admiralty requests for a report on their intentions, he 
insisted that ‘Mr. Kerensky specially asked me to stay… The Authorities are unanimous 
as to the advisability of not withdrawing this force at the moment’. 158  With the 
Bolsheviks in power, he suggested instead that the force should move south to join 
English forces in North Persia. British officials in Russia pointed out the impossibility 
of any such action. The Bolsheviks held the cars. They had no official sanction to move. 
There was no available train transport. The most important objection, in the view of 
Admiral Stanley and Generals Poole and Knox, was that to move to Persia they would 
have to pass through country held by the anti-Bolshevik leader Ataman Kaledin, and 
this would be taken as a move to assist him: no assertion of impartiality would be 
                                                 
154 Locker Lampson’s report, 16th August 1917, CHAR2/95/38-71 
155 Locker Lampson to Carson, 5th December 1917, CHAR2/95/73-81 
156 Delmar Morgan to Admiralty, 13th September 1917, ADM1/8484/69; undated ‘report on 
strength of force’, ADM116/3943B; Wells Hood lecture f. 67. 
157 Soames to Locker Lampson, 5th January 1918 ADM116/3943B; Locker Lampson, 
‘Nothing to offer but blood’ f. 216; ‘Sailors of Fortune’ 
158 Air Department to Delmar Morgan, 20th September 1917; Locker Lampson to Delmar 
Morgan, 14th October 1917, OLL177/224-7 
 27 
believed.159 The Bolshevik authorities would have been right to be suspicious. In a 
letter of early December Locker Lampson confirmed that ‘one of my officers is in touch 
with Kaledin now’: the cars might indeed be useful if ‘elements of order [should] 
coalesce in Russia and the South of Russia stiffen into resistance’. 160 A letter from the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Poole also demonstrates such mixed 
messages, typical of the period of Allied intervention. Firstly the CIGS stated that ‘you 
may give assurance that this detachment will not engage in any inter-Russian disputes’, 
but he followed this up with the suggestion to ‘get into touch with’ representatives of 
the armoured car force in Petrograd ‘so that any loyal Russians might assist this move 
on being told that the detachment does not intend to leave Russia altogether’.161 Locker 
Lampson also had designs on the Belgian armoured car unit, and suggested that 
members might volunteer to join the British detachment moving south, but the Belgian 
Minister of War wanted his unit to be repatriated intact.162 Despite Locker Lampson’s 
resistance, the cars were abandoned and the remaining British personnel were 
evacuated via Petrograd and Murmansk. Those men who returned to England were 
transferred to the Machine Gun Corps.163  
 In London Locker Lampson met with anti-Bolshevik Russians, lectured on 
Russia, and formulated interventionist schemes. His appointments in the winter and 
spring of 1917-18 included meetings at the Ministry of Information, with the Russian 
Ambassador Konstantin Nabokov and with General Poole, and lectures at the British 
Russia Club, the National Political League, in his constituency at Huntingdon, and at 
Ramsey Picture Palace.164 The War Cabinet of 6th December 1917 discussed a proposal 
of Locker Lampson’s for the resurrection of an eastern front, which anticipated the 
cooperation of Kornilov, Kaledin, the Queen of Romania, the British Navy, American 
troops, and Russian prisoners of war, with the British armoured car unit (and their 
Belgian counterparts) acting as a police force to ‘patrol the roads between Kiev, 
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Moscow, Petrograd and the front’. Locker Lampson was confident he could raise a 
thousand further volunteer mechanics in America and Northern Ireland. This project 
sounds outlandish, but no more so than many interventionist schemes of this period. 
The War Cabinet asked for a report on the matter to be sent to the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff. 165 In the summer of 1918 the Ministry of Information was seriously 
considering a propaganda mission in the Caucasus, to be headed by Locker Lampson, 
who would be supported by former members of the RNACD.166 Arrangements for the 
transfer of 27 men from the Navy to the Ministry of Information were approved, but 
this project fell down because of objections within the Ministry that the Caucasus was 
not a suitable location for propaganda, and that the only kind of propaganda that would 
work was covert infiltration of workers committees, not ‘an open propaganda unit of 
men who will advertise themselves as such and will stay in the best hotels’.  
The cars remained a pretext for a return. Both Locker Lampson and Wells Hood 
put forward plans for a small force which could retrieve the cars (which Locker 
Lampson had ‘spent a great deal of money on… which the Admiralty do not see their 
way to repay’), and in more aspirational terms might ‘form the nucleus of an Anglo-
Russian force’, ‘form a bodyguard for any Russian General of high command’, or ‘raise 
a Russian Army into a fighting condition’.167 General Poole’s opinion was that ‘no 
practical result will be obtained by sending back any officers’, and anyone who was 
sent should be placed directly under his command.168 In early 1919, General Ermolov 
assisted Locker Lampson’s efforts to be ‘sent’ back to Russia (to no avail), writing that 
General Denikin personally would value his knowledge and services in the anti-
Bolshevik cause.169 
 Many officers and men of the unit did contemplate returning. Some went out to 
Basra in a new formation of armoured cars and fought with General Dunsterville 
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against the Turks. They were still referred to as the ‘Locker Lampsons’.170 Walter 
Smiles, who joined this unit, wrote that he was ‘ready to go back to Russia, the sooner 
the better’.171 Leslie Hulls, who also served with Dunsterforce, was attached to the 
British military mission in Russia during the Second World War, and was still in touch 
with Smiles about all things Russian in the 1940s.172 Reginald Gregory answered the 
advertisement for volunteers for the British mission with Denikin in South Russia: this 
would be ‘fighting over “old country”… with “old friends”, both English and 
Russian’.173 King on the other hand recorded his intention to ‘wipe Russia off’ his 
‘visiting list’ after the war, and PO Pinkerton recalled seeing the call for volunteers for 
Russia, and his friends wondering why he ‘did not bound forward’.174 In the interwar 
years Locker Lampson remained involved in the anti-Bolshevik movement, funding 
and organizing anti-Bolshevik meetings and publications.175  
 
Remembering the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division 
In 1918-19 there was substantial interest in Britain in stories of war and revolution in 
Russia, but despite the threat posed to the war effort by Russia’s withdrawal, and the 
perceived international threat of Bolshevism, these were often presented as adventure 
stories. In some respects this suited members of the British armoured car unit. CPO 
Checkley published a ‘stirring account of the work and adventures’ of the armoured 
cars, co-written by adventure writer H J Shepstone, in the Wide World Magazine from 
March 1918. Commander Wells Hood developed a lecture, with slides, about the 
exploits of the armoured cars: he told his audience he would not concentrate on ‘the 
horrors of warfare’, but rather on the ‘local colour’ of his experiences in Russia.176 In 
the spring of 1918 Locker Lampson was offered ‘quite large sums’ by Lloyds Magazine 
for a series of articles. He wrote to Masterton Smith to enquire whether the articles 
would be ‘quite the thing to do’, assuring him that they would be based on ‘personal 
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adventures’, and would be ‘of quite an innocuous character’.177 Locker Lampson did 
not write an autobiography, but he drafted the table of contents, which indicates that 
such a book, if written, would have been equally full of derring-do, and equally 
detached from the reality of the RNACD experience in Russia. In one chapter he enters 
into ‘secret negotiations’ for the transfer of the armoured cars to Russia; in another, he 
personally persuades Kerensky to launch an offensive in the summer of 1917; and in a 
third he attempts to rescue the tsar by disguising him as an orderly with the armoured 
car unit. 178  The most outlandish example in this genre is Lieutenant Patterson’s 
manuscript loosely based on his experiences in the RNACD – a mixture of bizarre 
stories about Locker Lampson and imaginings about the actions of a monk attached to 
the Russian armed forces.179 These adventure stories reflect the sense of disconnection 
that members of the unit felt between their experience in Russia and the war on the 
western front. This disconnect is present in contemporary representations of the First 
World War too: while in Britain, France and the USA trench warfare in the west took 
centre stage in efforts to rationalize and remember the war, in Russia, the revolutionary 
watershed meant that for much of the twentieth century there was little interest in 
studying or commemorating the imperialist war that preceded it. 180  Despite the 
photographs and accounts of the RNACD’s Russian tour that remain in archives and in 
private hands, the unit’s Russian tour received little continued attention. While Norfolk-
based veterans of the unit gathered together in a local pub to be interviewed for a 1972 
Anglia TV documentary; little is remembered of the RNACD’s Irish contingent, whose 
experiences were considerably at odds with the dominant narrative of the fate of the 
Ulster Division in France and Belgium.  
In actual fact the RNACD’s experiences exemplified many of the characteristics 
of the Anglo-Russian relationship in the First World War. The profusion of channels of 
authority, which complicated their arrival; the logistics of supplying war materiel; the 
wild interventionist schemes designed to keep Russia in the war at all costs. As a case 
study their tour of Russia illustrates both the workings of the alliance, and the kinds of 
cultural encounter that the 1914-18 war engineered: it gives us insights into the ways 
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the war was managed, and the ways it was experienced and remembered. While some 
wartime structures imposed constraints upon the alliance – for example in terms of 
supply – it is clear that channels for decision-making, and the use of new technologies, 
could be fluid between and across the different fronts of the war. While both the British 
and the Russians inherited a repertoire of ideas about the alliance and about each other, 
there was also potential for new and unexpected encounters. In the revolutionary 
context, it is clear that, in contrast to the impression given by officers’ accounts, a 
degree of solidarity was possible between soldiers in the British and Russian armies, 
but also that the men’s sense of their own military identity imposed limits on this. In 
post-war reflections on their Russian tour, the sense of disconnection between the 
experience of war in the west and in the east is much stronger than the sense of a shared 
endeavor. The RNACD’s Russian tour helps us to understand how the connections 
between the western and eastern fronts were understood and navigated, both by 
diplomats, strategists and those in charge of supply, but also by men confronting, and 
returning from, an unfamiliar theatre of war. 
